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An advancement is a gift by a parent to a child, or to one to whom he
stands in loco parentis, which is intended as an anticipation of the share
which such child would take if the parent were to 'die intestate.' In
North Carolina, if an intestate gives realty or personalty to any of his
children, the value of the property so given Will be deducted from the
child's share upon distribution of the estate in order to equalize the
shares of the children or their descendents.2 If a child refuses to ac-
count for his advancements, he shall be considered to have received his
share of the parent's estate and shall not be entitled to receive any fur-
ther part.3
In order to constitute an advancement, there must be an actual de-
livery and change of possession.4
Whether there was an absolute gift, loan, or advancement depends
upon the intention of the grantor at the time of the transaction, taking
into consideration the circumstances surrounding the parties at the
time; and the intention existing at a prior or subsequent date will not
so determine.5 Thus, a gift absolute when it is made, cannot be con-
converted into an advancement by an subsequent statement of a wish to
that effect by the parent, short of a legally executed will.6 The fact that
the donee of a grant regarded it as an advancement will not of itself
determine the character of the transaction.7
Unless there is something in the circumstances tending to raise the
inference of a different purpose, a substantial gift of money or property
from a parent to a child will ordinarily be presumed to be an advance-
ment.8 But money expended for the education and maintenance of a
I King v. Neese, 233 N. C. 132, 63 S. E. 2d 123 (1950) ; Harrelson v. Gooden,
229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948) ; Lunsford v. Yarborough, 189 N. C. 476, 127
S. E. 426 (1925); Headen v. Headen, 42 N. C. 159 (1850).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (2) (1943, recompiled 1950); N. C. GEN. STAT.§ 28-150 (1943, recompiled 1950).
To illustrate: if a parent advanced $1,000 to his son A, $2,000 to his son B,
and nothing to his son C, and then died intestate possessed of an estate of $12,000
with the three sons as his sole heirs, to compute the share of each son, they must
add to the estate left by the decendent the sums which he had given by way of
advancements. This would be $15,000. The share of each son would be $5,000,
and this is the amount to which C is entitled; but as A and B received $1,000 and
$2,000 respectively, their shares will be $4,000 and $3,000.
1 N. C. GmN. STAT. § 28-151 (1943, recompiled 1950); Wolfe v. Galloway,
211 N. C. 361, 190 S. E. 213 (1937).
' Meadows v. Meadows, 33 N. C. 148 (1850).
'Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948) ; Paschel v.
Paschel, 197 N. C. 40, 147 S. E. 680 (1929); Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N. C.
207, 111 S. E. 180 (1922), See Note 26 A. L. R. 1086 (1923) ; Thompson v. Smith,
160 N. C. 256, 75 S. E. 1010 (1912) ; Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C. 456, 26 S. E. 38
(1896) ; Bradsher v. Cannady, 76 N. C. 445 (1877) ; James v. James, 76 N. C.
331 (1877).
C Bradsher v. Cannady, 76 N. C. 445 (1877).
Prevette v. Prevette, 203 N. C. 89, 164 S. E. 623 (1932).8 Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948); Creech v.
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child is not presumed to be an advancement, because they are the natural
duties which parents are required to perform.0 However, the pre-
sumption applies when property given is intended to help the child in a
business or profession,'0 or the settling of a child in life." These pre-
sumptions are not conclusive, but are rebuttable by parol evidence. 12
When the parent is indebted to a child and gives the latter property
or money, the presumption is that this is a payment of debt and not an
advancement.' 3  A conveyance for a nominal consideration 14 or the
purchase by a parent who takes title in name of the child1 are presumed
to be advancements to the child. Parol evidence is competent to rebut
the presumption arising on the face of the deed and show the real in-
tention of the parent.' 6 The presumption of advancement is not affected
by the reservation of a life estate.17
If an advancement is presumed from the conveyance, the burden of
proof rests upon the party claiming that an advancement was not in-
tended; but when the presumption is that there is no advancement, the
burden of proof shifts to the party claiming an advancement.' 8 Thus
where a deed from a parent to a child recites a consideration near the
value of the property conveyed, the presumption is that the conveyance
was not intended as an advancement, and the burden of proving it to be
an advancement is upon him who alleges it to be such.1
Evidence of the parent's declarations, which are not so close in point
of time to the transaction as to form in fact a part of it and not in the
presence of the child, that a conveyance from the parent to the child
was intended as an advancement, or otherwise, is inadmissible.20
Since the law of representation always applies to the descent of real
property in North Carolina, grandchildren must always account, in
Creech, 222 N. C. 656, 24 S. E. 2d 642 (1943); Nobles v. Davenport, 183
N. C. 207, 111 S. E. 180 (1922), See Note 26 A. L. R. 1086 (1923);
Thompson v. Smith, 160 N. C. 256, 75 S. E. 1010 (1912); Ex-Parte Griffin, 142
N. C. 116, 54 S. E. 1007 (1906) ; Harper v. Harper, 92 N. C. 300 (1885).
'Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C. 456, 26 S. E. 38 (1896); Bradsher v. Cannady,
76 N. C. 445 (1877). But also see Wolfe v. Galloway, 211 N. C. 361, 190 S. E.
213 (1937), where the heirs agreed that the referee's finding would be binding,
and the expenses of schooling a grandchild included in his report as advancements
were held as such by the court.
1 Meadows v. Meadows, 33 N. C. 148 (1850).11Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C. 456, 26 S. E. 38 (1896).
12 Thompson v. Smith, 160 N. C. 256, 75 S. E. 1010 (1912).
"Hagler v. McCombs, 66 N. C. 346 (1872).
"'Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948); Harper v.
Harper, 92 N. C. 300 (1885).
1" Creech v. Creech, 222 N. C. 656, 24 S. E. 2d 642 (1943).
"6 Ex-Parte Griffin, 142 N. C. 116, 54 S. E. 1007 (1906).
1 Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N. C. 207, 111 S. E. 180 (1922). See note 26




dividing land lineally descended, for advancements made to their an-
cestors.2 1 If personalty is given by an intestate to one of his children,
who died, leaving issue, in the lifetime of the intestate, such grand-
children take per stirpes and will be required to bring the advancements
into hotchpot.2 But if personalty is transferred to children, all of whom
die, leaving issue, during intestate's life time, such grandchildren take
per capita and do not account for advancements made to their respective
parents.2 When an intestate gives property directly to the grand-
children, they do not have to account for the property, regardless of
whether they take per capita or per stirpes.24
North Carolina is contra to the majority of jurisdictions with its rule
that advancements of personal property made by an intestate in his own
life time to his children are to be brought into 'distribution for the benefit
of the widow.2 5 Where the widow dissents from her husband's will, she
is entitled, in ascertaining her distributive share, to have advancements
of personalty made to legatees (children) under the will estimated as
part of her husband's estate, though as between themselves, there being
but a partial intestacy, such advancements are not subject to be brought
into hotchpot.26
An agreement by an heir of the intestate that he will take no part in
the distribution of the intestate's estate does not operate as an estoppel
against a subsequent assertion of his right. 27
The doctrine of advancements is based on the idea that parents are
presumed to intend, in the absence of a will, an equality of division
among the children ;28 therefore, in a case of partial intestacy, the doc-
trine of advancements does not exist. There must be entire intes-
tacy.29 So where a father died intestate as to his real property, but
testate as to his personal property, such of the children who had been
advanced lands before the father's death were not compelled to account
" Crump v. Faucett, 70 N. C. 345 (1874) ; Cromartie v. Kemp, 66 N. C. 38Z(1872).
"2 Parker v. Eason, 213 N. C. 115, 195 S. E. 360 (1938) ; Headen v. Headen,
42 N. C. 159 (1850).
Skinner v. Wynne, 55 N. C. 41 (1854) ; II MoRnEc-A's LAw L -rtrS 1345(2d ed. 1916).
" Parker v. Eason, 213 N. C. 115, 195 S. E. 360 (1938) ; Headen v. Headen,
42 N. C. 159 (1850). But see Wolfe v. Galloway, footnote 9 supra.
"Eller v. Lillard, 107 N. C. 486, 12 S. E. 462 (1890) ; Headen v. Headen, 42
N. C. 159 (1850) ; Duke v. Duke, 1 N. C. 526 (1801) ; see note 76 A. L. R. 1420(1932). The question of whether a child advanced more than his total share of
the estate must account to the widow in computing her share has not been decided
by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
"Arrington v. Dortch, 77 N. C. 367 (1877) ; Worth v. McNeil, 57 N. C. 272(1858).
"
TMelvin v. Bullard, 82 N. C. 34 (1880); Cannon v. Nowell, 51 N. C. 436
(1859).28Thompson v. Smith, 160 N. C. 256, 75 S. E. 1010 (1912).
20 Jenkins v. Mitchell, 57 N. C. 207 (1858); Donnell v. Mateer, 40 N. C. 7
(1847); Richmond v. Vanhook, 38 N. C. 581 (1845).
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for them in the -division among all his children of his real estate.8 0 It is
frequently necessary to use parol evidence to construe advancements
or equivalent terms used in the will itself, but extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to contradict terms of the will as to the fact or amounts of
advancements, where such sums are absolutely charged against such
legatees.31 -Thus where there is an express declaration on the part of
the testator that before a daughter is permitted to share in the distribu-
tion of his estate she shall account for an advancement, it is not open
to her to show that she received more than the sum or less, or that she
received nothing at all.3 2
The amount which should be charged as an advancement is the value
of the property as of the date that it is made, and not as of any subse-
quent time.3  If the value of the advancement increases, the
child has the benefit; if it decreases, it falls on the child.3 4 So where the
value of the property advanced to a son was completely diminished, the
son was still charged with the value at the time of delivery. 5
Even if value of some sort is paid by the grantee, a conveyance may
be an advancement as to its value in excess of such consideration.3 0
Where a father conveyed to his son a tract of land worth $1,200 for
which the son paid $400, the $800 excess of value over the price paid was
charged as an advancement.37
No interest should be charged against an advancement on accounting,
provided the accounting is had within two years allowed by law for the
settlement of the estate.3 8
The personalty of the estate is made the primary fund for the equali-
zation of advancements of personalty, and the realty is made the primary
fund for the equalization of advancements of realty, and it is only when
and to the extent that there is an excessive advancement in either cate-
gory of property over and above the share which may come to the other
beneficiaries that such excess may be considered in the distribution of the
other category.3 9 So where an advancement in real estate to a son was
3 Jenkins v. Mitchell, 57 N. C. 207 (1858).
"1Dodson v. Fulk, 147 N. C. 530, 61 S. E. 196 (1908).
3 Dodson v. Fulk, 147 N. C. 530, 61 S. E. 196 (1908).
" Langsford v. Yarborough, 189 N. C. 476, 127 S. E. 426 (1925) ; Tart v. Tart,
154 N. C. 502, 70 S. E. 929 (1911); Ward v. Riddick, 57 N. C. 22 (1858) ; Raiford
v. Raiford, 41 N. C. 490 (1849); Meadows v. Meadows, 33 N. C. 148 (1850);
Lamb v. Carroll, 28 N. C. 4 (1845).
8" Banks v. Shannonhouse, 61 N. C. 284 (1867) ; Walton v. Walton, 42 N. C.
138 (1850) ; Hicks v. Forrest, 41 N. C. 528 (1850).
'Banks v. Shannonhouse, 61 N. C. 284 (1867); Walton v. Walton. 42 N. C.
138 (1850) ; Hicks v. Forrest, 41 N. C. 528 (1850).
6 Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948); Barbee v.
Barbee, 109 N. C. 299, 13 S. E. 792 (1891).
" Barbee v. Barbee, 109 N. C. 229. 13 S. E. 792 (1891).
" Lansford v. Yarborough, 189 N. C. 476, 127 S. E. 426 (1925) ; Tart v. Tart,
154 N. C. 502, 70 S. E. 929 (1911) ; Hanner v. Winburn, 42 N. C. 142 (1850).3 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (2) (1943, recompiled 1950); N. C. GEN. STAT.§ 28-150 (1943, recompiled 1950); King v. Neese, 233 N. C. 132, 63 S. E. 2d
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of greater value than an equal share descending to the other children,
the one so advanced was charged in the distribution of the personal
estate of the parent with the excess in value over an equal share.40
The Legislature has passed statutes which permit the clerk of the
Superior Court to advance portions of a nonsane person's estate to cer-
tain of the latter's relatives, which must be accounted for at death.41
WMv. WHITFIELD SMITH
Federal jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship-Multiple
Corporations
Plaintiff, a citizen of Massachusetts, brought a personal injury action
in the federal district court for Massachusetts against defendant railroad
corporation, alleging it to be incorporated under the laws of New York.
Defendant was in fact a multiple corporation existing under the laws of
New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. The court of appeals,
in affirming the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction, held that
for purposes of federal jurisdiction a multiple corporation must be re-
garded in each state of its incorporation as solely domesticated therein,
and that there is no diversity of citizenship jurisdiction where such cor-
poration is sued in one of the states of its incorporation by a citizen of
that same state.1
The district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $3000 and is between citizens of different states.2 When the Supreme
Court first considered the status of corporations in connection with the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, it held that a corporation was not a
citizen and that the citizenship of the stockholders would control.3 The
Court later adopted the fiction that there is a conclusive presumption
that all the stockholders of a corporation are citizens of the state of in-
corporation.4 Under this fiction,5 a corporation created under the laws
123 (1950). No North Carolina case has passed on the question of recovery from
an heir of an excess of advancements over his whole distributive share in the estate.
But cases outside of North Carolina are in accord in ruling that the heir cannot be
required to refund the excess, but can only be excluded from participating in the
division of the estate. See note, 46 A. L. R. 1428 (1927).
40 Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948).
"N. C. GFN. STAT. § 35-19 through § 35-29 (1943, recompiled 1950) ; Patrick
v. Trust Co., 216 N. C. 525, 5 S. E. 2d 724 (1939).
Seavey v. Boston & Maine . R, 197 F. 2d 485 (1st Cir. 1952).
-62 STAT. 930 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 1332 (1949).
'Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61 (U. S. 1809).
'This doctrine was first announced in Louisville, C. & C. R. R. v. Letson, 2
How. 497 (U. S. 1844). It is forcefully stated in Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S.
444, 445 (1876), as follows: "For the purposes of jurisdictioif it is conclusively
presumed that all stockholders are citizens of the state which by its laws created
the corporation."
'The fiction has been severely criticized as judicial usurpation. McGovney,
A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HARv. L. Rxv. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943).
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